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Model Checking the Optimal Behavior of Big Markov Processes



Oregon State
University

Robots are making ethical decisions

- 1400 autonomous vehicles on roads in the US
- Nurse robots in Japan
- Police robots in LA suburb



Are they making the right decisions?





INSIDER

Police robots keep malfunctioning, with mishaps ranging from running over a toddler's foot to ignoring people in distress

How can we get guarantees about norm compliance?

- Safe reinforcement learning*
- Formal verification




* Brunke, Lukas, et al. "Safe learning in robotics: From learning-based control to safe reinforcement learning." *Annual Review of Control, Robotics, and Autonomous Systems* 5 (2022): 411-444.

Outline

- The problem with specifying norms in alethic logics
- The need for deontic modalities
- Expected Act Utilitarian Deontic Logic
- Strategic modalities
- Model checking strategic obligations
- Results

Specifying behavior in Computational Tree Logic


“The car can go 149 mph.”



$$m \models \exists \Diamond (v=149)$$

Specifying behavior in CTL

“The car shouldn’t go more than 80 mph.”




$$m \models \neg \exists \diamond (v > 80)$$

Specifying behavior in CTL

“The car can go 149 mph.”

“The car shouldn’t go more than 80 mph.”




$m \models \exists \diamond (v=149)$ What is possible

$m \models \neg \exists \diamond (v>80)$ What is preferable

$m \models \perp$ 💥

Possible worlds, Preferable worlds

- Alethic logic
- Deontic logic



Logic

$\neg \textit{speed}$

Not speeding

Temporal Logic

$$\Box(\neg speed)$$

Always not speeding

= never speeding

Act Temporal Logic

α cstit: $\Box \neg speed$

The agent acts to ensure that
it's never speeding

Dominance Act Utilitarian Deontic Logic

$\odot[\alpha \text{ cstit: } \Box \neg \text{speed}]$

By acting optimally,
the agent acts to ensure that
it's never speeding

Expected Act Utilitarian Deontic Logic


$$\otimes[\alpha \text{ cstit: } P_{>0.2} [\diamond \text{ red}]]$$

By acting optimally,
the agent acts to ensure that
with probability at least 0.2
eventually in red

Specifying behavior in EAU

“The car can go 149 mph.”

“The car should probably never go more than 80 mph.”



$$m \models \alpha \text{ cstit}: \Diamond (v=149)$$

What is possible

$$m \models_{\otimes} [\alpha \text{ cstit}: P_{\geq 0.9} [\Box \neg (v > 80)]]$$

What is preferable

*Possible and Preferable specified
in the same language!*

EAU Semantics


$$Q(K_2) = 10/2 + 5/2 = 7.5$$

$$Q(K_j) = \max\{7, 6.8\} = 7$$

$$\{K_2\} = E\text{-Optimal}_\alpha^m$$

$$m \models \otimes[\alpha \text{ cstit}: B]$$

$$m \models \otimes[\alpha \text{ cstit}: P_{>0.49}[H]]$$




EAU Semantics

$$Q(K_2) = 10/2 + 5/2 = 7.5$$

$$Q(K_1) = \max\{8, 6.8\} = 8$$

$$\{K_i\} = E\text{-Optimal}^m_\alpha$$

$$m \models \neg \otimes [\alpha \text{ cstit: } A]$$




EAU Semantics: Strategic *stit*

$$\pi^* = \{K_1, K_3\}$$

$$m \models [\alpha \pi\text{-stit}: A]$$

$$m \models \otimes[\alpha \pi\text{-stit}: A]$$




Example Obligation in an MDP

Does the agent have
the obligation to enter a
red state more than
20% of the time?

-1 name=15	-1 name=16	-1 name=17	-1 name=18	-1 name=19
S name=10		-1 name=12		+10 g name=14
-1 name=5	-1 name=6	-1 name=7	-1 name=8	-1 name=9
-10 name=0	-10 name=1	-10 name=2	-10 name=3	-10 name=4

Model Checking Strategic Obligations


1. Given an MDP \mathcal{M} , and a strategic obligation φ



$$\varphi = \otimes [\alpha \pi\text{-stit}: P_{>0.75} [\neg \Diamond s=4]]$$

Model Checking Strategic Obligations


1. Given an MDP \mathcal{M} , a policy π , and a strategic obligation φ
2. Find the optimal policy



$$\varphi = \otimes [\alpha \pi\text{-stit}: P_{>0.75} [\neg \Diamond s=4]]$$

Model Checking Strategic Obligations


1. Given an MDP \mathcal{M} , a policy π , and a strategic obligation φ
2. Find the optimal policy
3. Remove sub-optimal actions



$$\varphi = \otimes [\alpha \pi\text{-stit}: P_{>0.75} [\neg \Diamond s=4]]$$

Model Checking Strategic Obligations

1. Given an MDP \mathcal{M} , a policy π , and a strategic obligation φ
2. Find the optimal policy
3. Remove sub-optimal actions
4. Check PCTL




$$\varphi = \otimes [\alpha \pi\text{-stit}: P_{>0.75} [\neg \Diamond s=4]]$$

Model checking big MDPs

$$m \models [\alpha \pi\text{-stit}: \Box (\theta \in [72^\circ - 108^\circ])]$$

$$m \models \neg \otimes [\alpha \pi\text{-stit}: \Box (\theta \in [72^\circ - 108^\circ])]$$



Timing Results

	<i>formula</i>	<i>stit</i> check time (s)	<i>ought</i> check time (s)
φ_1	$P_{\geq 0.2}[F(aq0 aq4)]$	47.16	21.03
φ_2	$P_{\geq 0.00001}[F(aq0 aq4)]$	47.10	20.73
φ_3	$P_{\geq 0.1}[Gaq2]$	55.42	24.63
φ_4	$P_{< 0.7}[Gaq2]$	47.83	20.80
φ_5	$P_{< 0.7}[F xq0]$	56.60	20.92
φ_6	$P_{\geq 0.7}[F xq0]$	63.38	24.97
φ_7	$P_{> 0.7}[G xq0]$	56.29	24.94
		53.40	22.57

What EAU can do for You

- Reason about strategic obligations

$$\varphi = \otimes [\alpha \pi\text{-stit}: P_{>0.75} [\neg \Diamond s=4]]$$

- Verify strategic behaviors

$$m \models [\alpha \pi\text{-stit}: \Box (\theta \in [72^\circ - 108^\circ])]$$

- Even on large systems

$$m \models \neg \otimes [\alpha \pi\text{-stit}: \Box (\theta \in [72^\circ - 108^\circ])]$$

Outline

- How much of the presentation should be motivation for the use of deontic logic? Probably $\sim 1/3$ - it's CAV, after all
- Follow deontic logic motivation with EAU syntax stuff
- Then introduce the strategic stit
- If there were any problems earlier given that need s-stit to solve, then solve them with s-stit
- Discuss size of DAC-MDPs, cart-pole, and empirical results